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RUNS AFOUL OF THE FIRST
AMENDMENT
Congress enacted the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Or-
ganizations Act ("RICO")1 as part of the Organized Crime Control
Act of 1970,2 a comprehensive plan designed to combat organized
crime in the United States.3 To accomplish this goal, RICO equips
1 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1988 & Supp. 1990). The RICO acronym was apparently in-
spired by "Rico" Bendello, the mobster portrayed by Edward G. Robinson in the movie
"Little Caesar." Alito, Racketeering Made Simple(r), in THE Rico RACKET 1 (1989).
2 Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922 (1970) (codi-
fied as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1988 & Supp. 1990)).
3 See id. The Statement of Findings and Purposes of the Organized Crime Control Act
of 1970 explained that:
(1) organized crime in the United States is a highly sophisticated, diversified, and
widespread activity that annually drains billions of dollars from America's econ-
omy by unlawful conduct and the illegal use of force, fraud and corruption; (2)
organized crime derives a major portion of its power through money obtained
from such illegal endeavors as syndicated gambling, loan sharking, the theft and
fencing of property, the importation and distribution of narcotics and other dan-
gerous drugs, and other forms of social exploitation; (3) this money and power are
increasingly used to infiltrate and corrupt legitimate business and labor unions
and to subvert and corrupt our democratic processes; (4) organized crime activi-
ties in the United States weaken the stability of the Nation's economic system,
harm innocent investors and competing organizations, interfere with free competi-
tion, seriously burden interstate and foreign commerce, threaten the domestic se-
curity, and undermine the general welfare of the Nation and its citizens; and (5)
organized crime continues to grow because of defects in the evidence-gathering
process of the law inhibiting the development of the legally admissible evidence
necessary to bring criminal and other sanctions or remedies to bear on the unlaw-
ful activities of those engaged in organized crime and because the sanctions and
remedies available to the Government are unnecessarily limited in scope and
impact.
It is the purpose of this Act to seek the eradication of organized crime in the
United States by strengthening the legal tools in the evidence-gathering process,
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prosecutors with powerful new tools, including stiff criminal sanc-
tions,4 property forfeiture provisions, 5 and equitable relief in the
form of injunctions.6 RICO also provides civil relief to citizens in-
jured in conjunction with a RICO violation through a private cause
of action and permits recovery of both treble damages and litiga-
tion costs.' Though initially aimed at curbing organized crime ac-
tivities,8 RICO has been successfully implemented against securi-
ties firms,9 large corporations, 10 and video dealers as well."
Recently, in McMonagle v. Northeast Women's Center, Inc.,2
the United States Supreme Court denied certiorari on a decision
by establishing new penal prohibitions, and by providing enhanced sanctions and
new remedies to deal with the unlawful activities of those engaged in organized
crime.
Id. at 922-23.
4 18 U.S.C. § 1963 (1988). Section 1963 provides that "[w]hoever violates any provision
of section 1962 of this chapter shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 20
years (or for life if the violation is based on a racketeering activity for which the maximum
penalty includes life imprisonment) or both." Id.
6 Id. § 1963(a). "Property subject to forfeiture" includes real property, as well as tangi-
ble and intangible personal property. Id. § 1963(b)(1), (2).
6 Id. § 1963(d).
7 Id. § 1964(c). The private civil suit provision was not an original part of the RICO bill
that was passed by the Senate, but was only included in the House bill and was rarely
mentioned in the floor debates. See Crovitz, RICO: The Legalized Extortion and Shake-
down Racket, in THE RICO RAcKET 26-27 (1989).
The Second Circuit noted that there were few guidelines to determine the scope of the
private civil action provided for in RICO. See Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 741 F.2d 482,
488 (2d Cir. 1984), rev'd on other grounds, 473 U.S. 479 (1985). The court further stated
that analogies drawn in the Senate Report to the civil suit provisions of antitrust law could
not be applied to the private action section which was added to RICO subsequent to the
date of the Senate Report. Id. at 489.
During the early days of RICO, the civil action provision was applied in limited situa-
tions where "organized syndicates caused identifiable damages to private individuals."
Crovitz, supra, at 27. However, the use of civil RICO has greatly expanded. Id. From 1970 to
1980 there were only nine federal court decisions on civil RICO, but by 1985 there were 300
federal decisions on civil RICO, and up to the present time there have been several thou-
sand. Id.
8 See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
0 See Moss v. Morgan Stanley, Inc., 719 F.2d 5, 5 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S.
1025 (1984). Recently, the burden of a large RICO penalty contributed to the collapse and
bankruptcy of Drexel Burnham Lambert, one of Wall Street's leading brokerage firms. See
N.Y. Times, Feb. 14, 1990, at Dl.
10 See Crovitz, supra note 7, at 27. A non-exclusive list of corporate civil RICO defend-
ants includes: Aetna Casualty and Surety, Allstate Insurance, Citibank, General Motors, Ex-
xon, Miller Brewing, and Touche Ross. Id.
" See United States v. Pryba, 674 F. Supp. 1504, 1506 (E.D. Va. 1987), aff'd, 900 F.2d
748 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 305 (1990). In Pryba, the defendants were indicted
under RICO for distributing obscene videotapes. Id.
12 110 S. Ct. 261 (1989).
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by the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit that
allowed a civil RICO action to be brought against an anti-abortion
group that had conducted protest activities against an abortion
clinic. 13 Justice White, however, issued a dissenting opinion in
which he asserted that the Court should settle the question of
whether RICO liability could be imposed "where neither the 'en-
terprise' nor the 'pattern of racketeering activity' had any profit
making element.' 1 4 Unfortunately, Justice White did not address
specifically the potential first amendment problems encountered
when civil RICO is applied against social activists attempting to
influence public opinion through vigorous protesting. 5
Should RICO continue to be invoked against protest organiza-
tions, a conflict could arise between the rights of citizens to express
their views and the rights of other citizens to prohibit such ex-
pressive conduct through the threat of a RICO civil lawsuit.'6 This
Note will explore the possibility that the use of RICO against so-
Is Id. at 261. The RICO suit was based on four incidents where the defendants entered
the plaintiff's facilities unlawfully. See Northeast Women's Center, Inc. v. McMonagle, 868
F.2d 1342, 1345 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 261 (1989). The plaintiff, the Northeast
Women's Center, Inc., was a gynecological clinic which provided abortions. Id. The defend-
ants were 26 anti-abortion protesters, some of whom were associated with the Pro-Life Coa-
lition of Southeast Pennsylvania. Id.
, McMonagle, 110 S. Ct. at 261 (White, J., dissenting). Justice White, in his dissent,
noted that the Second and Eighth Circuits have held that they would not uphold RICO
liability where there has been no economic motivation behind the racketeering activity. Id.
(White, J., dissenting). In United States v. Ivic, 700 F.2d 51 (2d Cir. 1983), the Second
Circuit ruled that predicate acts must have a financial purpose. See id. at 58-65. Similarly,
the Eighth Circuit in United States v. Flynn, 852 F.2d 1045 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S.
974 (1988), determined that the enterprise must be directed toward an economic goal. Id. at
1052.
The issue of an "economic motivation" or the requirement of some pecuniary gain by
the defendant as a prerequisite to a civil RICO suit has been proposed as a RICO reform.
See Melley, The Stretching of Civil RICO: Pro-Life Demonstrators Are Racketeers?, 56
U.M.K.C. L. REv. 287, 310 (1988); see also Nat'l L.J., May 8, 1989, at 13 (ACLU has joined
anti-RICO coalition promoting reforms in statute).
16 See McMonagle, 110 S. Ct. at 261-64 (White, J., dissenting). The Third Circuit dis-
cussed the first amendment issue briefly, concluding that "the First Amendment does not
offer sanctuary for violators." McMonagle, 868 F.2d at 1348-49 (quoting district court's jury
instructions).
16 See Melley, supra note 14, at 308-312. The Supreme Court has stated that a massive
effort to effect social and political change should "not be characterized as a violent conspir-
acy simply by reference to the ephemeral consequences of a relatively few violent acts."
NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 933 (1982). On the other hand, Patricia
Ireland, the executive vice president of the National Organization for Women, believes that
"[a]s long as antiabortion extremists continue to behave like gangsters, it is wholly appro-
priate to treat them as gangsters under the racketeering laws." See The Washington Post,
July 8, 1989, at A-15.
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cial activists may infringe upon the first amendment right of free
expression. Part One will examine the RICO statute and its civil
suit provision to provide a background for the analysis to follow.
Part Two will consider the applicability of RICO to protest groups
whose activities arguably fall under the definition of "racketeer-
ing" activities contained in the statute. Finally, Part Three will fo-
cus on the first amendment issues which arise when RICO is used
to sanction protest activities.
I. RICO AND THE CIVIL SUIT PROVISION
In general, RICO makes it a crime to participate in the affairs
of an enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity." Under
RICO, "enterprise" is broadly defined as any individual, partner-
ship, corporation, association, or legal entity;'8 a "pattern" is de-
scribed as two acts of racketeering activity within ten years of each
other; 9 and "racketeering activity" is characterized as any criminal
act listed in the statute.20 RICO also makes it a crime to invest the
proceeds of any racketeering activity,2 acquire an interest in an
enterprise through racketeering,22 or conspire to violate any of the
RICO provisions.2
As to individuals, RICO permits "[a]ny person injured in his
7 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (1988). Section 1962(c) is the provision most commonly used in
civil RICO suits. See Alito, supra note 1, at 11. It reads: "(i)t shall be unlawful for any
person employed by or associated with any enterprise engaged in .... interstate or foreign
commerce, to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enter-
prise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity." 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c); see infra
notes 21-23 and accompanying text (discussion of section 1962).
Is 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4) (1988). The list of entities set out in section 1961(4) is illustrative
and clearly not exhaustive. See United States v. Thevis, 665 F.2d 616, 625 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 456 U.S. 1008, cert. denied, 458 U.S. 1109 (1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 825 (1984).
Is 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5) (1988). At least one of the acts in the pattern has to have oc-
curred after the effective date of the statute. Id. The Senate Report explains that "(t)he
target of [RICO] is thus not sporadic activity [and] [t]he infiltration of legitimate business
normally requires more than one 'racketeering activity' and the threat of continuing activity
to be effective. It is this factor of continuity plus relationship which combines to produce a
pattern." S. REP. No. 617, 91st Cong., 158 (1969). The proof of two acts of racketeering
activity, without more, does not establish a pattern for purposes of RICO. 116 CONG. REc.
18940 (1970) (statement of Sen. McClellan); see Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S.
479, 496 n.14 (1984).
20 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) (1988). The criminal acts delineated in section 1961(1) are also
referred to as "predicate acts." See Alito, supra note 1, at 4.
21 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a) (1988). Under certain circumstances, the purchase of securities
on the open market for investment purposes only is exempted. Id.
:2 Id. § 1962(b).
23 Id. § 1962(d).
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business or property by reason of" a RICO violation to sue the
racketeering individual or enterprise and recover treble damages
plus attorney's fees.2' While some lower federal courts initially at-
tempted to restrict civil suits under RICO,2" the Supreme Court
rejected these limitations in Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co.26 In
Sedima, the Court overturned a Second Circuit ruling which held
that a civil RICO claim could only be brought against a defendant
who had previously been convicted under the criminal provisions
of RICO, and that a private RICO claimant must allege a "rack-
eteering injury," separate and apart from the injury inherent in the
predicate offense.
Federal courts have broad discretion when fashioning a civil
21 Id. § 1964(c). "To state a claim for damages under RICO, a plaintiff has two pleading
burdens. First, he must allege that the defendant has violated" section 1962. Moss v. Mor-
gan Stanley, Inc., 719 F.2d 5, 17 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1025 (1984). Secondly,
he must allege injury to his business or property as a result of the section 1962 violation. Id.
To satisfy the first burden, a plaintiff must plead seven elements: (1) that the defendant; (2)
committed two or more acts; (3) comprising a pattern; (4) of racketeering activity; (5) and
invests in, has an interest in, or participates in; (6) an enterprise; (7) involved in interstate
commerce. Id.
Although there is no provision for an award of attorneys' fees to a defendant in a civil
RICO action, fees have been awarded where a plaintiff was found to have commenced a
RICO action in bad faith. See Financial Fed'n, Inc. v. Ashkenazy, 1984 Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) % 91,489 (C.D. Cal. May 9, 1983).
25 Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 741 F.2d 482, 483 (2d Cir.), rev'd, 473 U.S. 479 (1984).
Four significant judge-made restrictions on civil RICO existed before the Sedima decision;
(1) the defendant must have been connected with organized crime; (2) the plaintiff must
have suffered a competitive or indirect injury; (3) the enterprise must have existed sepa-
rately from the pattern of racketeering activity; and (4) the plaintiff must have suffered a
racketeering enterprise injury. See Moran, Pleading a Civil RICO Action Under Section
1962(c): Conflicting Precedent and the Practioner's Dilemma, 57 TEMP. L.Q. 731, 746-47
(1984). The Seventh Circuit, however, chose not to limit civil RICO to convicted members of
organized crime enterprises. See Haroco, Inc. v. American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 747 F.2d
384, 392 (7th Cir. 1984), aff'd, 473 U.S. 606 (1985). In Haroco, the predicate act was mail
fraud allegedly committed by a bank scheming to defraud by overstating the prime rate. Id.
at 385.
While a prior criminal conviction requirement has been proposed as a reform to RICO,
see Lacovara & Aronow, The Legal Shakedown of Legitimate Business People: The Run-
away Provisions of Private Civil RICO, 21 NEw ENG. L. REv. 1, 28 (1988), there are others
who believe that requiring a criminal conviction as a prerequisite to a civil suit would "leave
victims of business fraud at the mercy of federal prosecutors in bringing their suits," The
ACLU's Bad Bargain, Nat'l L.J., May 8, 1989, at 13, col. 1.
26 473 U.S. 479, 500 (1984).
27 Id.; see also, McArthur & White, Civil RICO After Sedima: The New Weapon
Against Business Fraud, 23 Hous. L. REv. 743, 767 (1986) (RICO provides treble damages
for "garden variety" business fraud); Comment, The RICO Pattern After Sedima-A Case
for Multifactored Analysis, 19 SEsrON HALL L. Rav. 73, 83 (1989) (special racketeering injury
does not have to be plead and proven by plaintiff in civil RICO suit).
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remedy to a RICO violation.2" In addition to awarding damages
and attorneys' fees, a court may impose restrictions on the future
operations of the enterprise, enjoin certain individuals from future
participation in the enterprise, or dissolve and reorganize the rack-
eteering enterprise.29 However, while RICO's broad scope and
stringent penalties make it an effective weapon against organized
criminal activity, it also increases the potential for its abuse.30
II. APPLYING RICO TO THE PROTEST ORGANIZATION IN
McMonagle
In McMonagle, the Northeast Women's Center ("the Center")
alleged that it suffered injury to its property and business when
the defendant protesters entered the Center during an anti-abor-
tion protest.3 Initially, the Third Circuit determined that the in-
2 See 18 U.S.C. § 1964(a) (1988). Initially, there was debate as to whether a private
plaintiff could petition the court for the equitable remedies outlined in section 1964(a). See
Sedima, 741 F.2d at 488-90. However, it should be noted that Professor Blakey, formerly
Chief Counsel to the Senate Subcommittee on Criminal Laws and Procedures, has written
that:
[a] congressional grant of the right to sue in the absence of statutory limitations,
conveys the availability of all necessary and appropriate relief. Significantly, the
treble damage clause of § 1964(c) is preceded by "and" and not "to." Conse-
quently, the availability of comprehensive civil relief should prove of particular
significance, for example, in the area of government fraud at the state and local
level.
Blakey & Gettings, Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO): Basic Con-
cepts-Criminal and Civil Remedies, 53 TEMP. L.Q. 1009, 1038 n.133 (1980) (citations
omitted).
29 18 U.S.C. § 1964(a) (1988). The list of remedies contained in the statute is illustra-
tive and not exhaustive. Id.
10 See Boucher, Civil RICO: A Statute Out of Control, in THE RICO RACKET 44-46
(1989). A bill was introduced in the 101st Congress by Representative Boucher (Dem.-Va.)
and Senator DeConcini (Dem.-Az.) which contains a number of amendments to the civil
RICO suit provision. See H.R. 1046, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989); S. 438, 101st Cong., 1st
Sess. (1989). The major changes proposed include the elimination of automatic treble dam-
ages, except when the defendant has been convicted of a felony. See H.R. 1046, 101st Cong.,
1st Sess. § 4(5) (1989). Under the bill, most government plaintiffs would also recover double
the damages suffered as a punitive remedy. Id. § 4(2)(c). The bill also provides for double
damages for personal injuries suffered as a result of racketeering activity. Id. § 4(3). Finally,
the bill adds several new crimes to the list of "racketeering activity" contained in section
1961(1). Id. § 2(2).
Another bill has been introduced into the House of Representatives by Representative
LaFalce (Dem.-N.Y.). See H.R. 3522, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989). This less complex bill
simply eliminates "any conduct consisting of nonviolent protest" from the list of crimes in
section 1961(1). Id.
81 See McMonagle, 868 F.2d at 1345-47. The first incident cited by the plaintiff oc-
curred on December 8, 1984 when approximately 50 protesters, 12 of whom were defendants
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jury suffered by the Center need not be competitive in nature to
entitle the Center to seek redress under RICO. 2 Instead, the court
stated that the damage inflicted on the Center's medical equip-
ment "was sufficient to meet RICO's injury requirement." 33 The
Center structured its argument to fit within RICO by contending
that the defendants had caused injury by conducting the affairs of
their enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity in that
the defendant's protest activities were in violation of the Hobbs
in this lawsuit, entered the Center, knocked down the Center's employees who tried to stop
them, blocked access to the examining rooms, and scattered medical supplies around the
Center. Id. There was testimony that during this incident a Center employee was injured.
Id. A total of 30 demonstraters were arrested and the Center responded by hiring security
guards to control future demonstrations. Id. at 1345.
On August 10, 1985, 12 of the defendants reentered the Center and locked themselves
in an operating room. Id. at 1346. An employee of the Center testified that she saw one of
the defendants leave the center with an object under his coat. Id. In addition, during the
protest, some of the machinery in the operating room was dissembled and damaged. Id.
The third incident occurred on October 19, 1985 when the defendants again attempted
to enter the clinic. Id. Twenty-four of the defendants were arrested and three were con-
victed of defiant trespass. Id. The fourth and final demonstration occurred on May 23, 1986
when the protesters entered the clinic, sat down on the waiting room floor, and reprimanded
patients awaiting treatment. Id. There was also evidence presented of other occasions when
demonstrators conducted protests outside of the Center during which they chanted with
bullhorns, blocked the entrance of the Center, and pounded on employees' cars. Id.
Two Center employees testified that they resigned from their positions because of the
repeated harassment by the protesters. Id. Further, in July of 1986, the Center lost its lease
and moved to a new location equipped with a sophisticated security system, which thwarted
a fifth demonstration.
A jury awarded the Center $887.00 in damages under the RICO claim, $42,087.95 in
compensatory damages for trespass, and $48,000.00 in punitive damages ($2,000.00 per de-
fendant). Id. at 1347. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsyl-
vania also enjoined the defendants from protesting on the Center premises or the parking
lot adjacent to the Center, but set aside the punitive damages award. Id. Upon review on
appeal, the Third Circuit affirmed the damages award, and remanded the issue of additional
injunctive relief back to the district court. Id. at 1357.
12 See id. at 1349; see also supra notes 25-27 and accompanying text (discussion of
judicial attempts to resrict RICO). The Third Circuit further stressed that it did not recog-
nize the requirement that there be an economic motivation behind the "racketeering activ-
ity." See McMonagle, 868 F.2d at 1349-50. The plaintiff argued that even if an economic
motive was required, there was sufficient economic motivation based upon McMonagle's tes-
timony that he raised $120,000 a year for the Pro-Life Coalition of Southeast Pennsylvania
which coordinated the protests and was paid $32,000 a year as its director. Id. at 1349 n.7.
13 McMonagle, 868 F.2d at 1349. Since the medical equipment was damaged during one
of the allegedly extortionate acts designed to drive the Center out of business, the Third
Circuit concluded that RICO's injury requirement was satisfied. Id. at 1350. The Hobbs Act
extortion claim was based on the interference with the intangible right to conduct business.
Id. The Third Circuit pointed to the fact that the Hobbs Act protects intangible as well as
tangible property rights. Id.
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Act, one of the predicate acts enumerated in RICO. "
The Hobbs Act prohibits the obstruction of interstate com-
merce through extortion,35 and defines "extortion" as "the ob-
taining of property from another, with his consent, induced by
wrongful use of actual or threatened force, violence, or fear."36 The
Hobbs Act's proscription against obstructing commerce through
extortion is very broad.3 7 For example, a company's right to make
"a business decision free from outside pressure" is a property right
under the Hobbs Act.38 The fear wrongfully instilled by extortion-
ists which induces the target to relinquish its property can even be
merely fear of economic loss.39
In McMonagle, in order for the Center to recover treble dam-
ages under RICO, the Center's injury had to have been caused by
the violation of the Hobbs Act.40 In satisfaction of this require-
ment, the Center claimed that the defendants used "force, threats
31 Id. at 1348.
-- 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a) (1988). The Hobbs Act provides that "whoever in any way or
degree obstructs, delays, or affects commerce ... by robbery or extortion... shall be fined
not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than twenty years, or both." Id. This was not
the first application of the Hobbs Act to anti-abortion protesters. See United States v. An-
derson, 716 F.2d 446, 447 (7th Cir. 1983). In Anderson, the defendants were members of an
anti-abortion group called the Army of God. Id. After kidnapping a doctor who performed
abortions, the defendants threatened to kill him if he did not promise to cease performing
abortions and close his clinic. Id. at 448. Found to be guilty under the Hobbs Act of conspir-
acy and attempting to obstruct, delay, and affect interstate commerce through extortionate
means, the defendants were convicted and sentenced to jail for 30 years. Id.
3- 18 U.S.C. § 1951(b)(2) (1988). Extortion is commonly defined as the wrongful use of
economic fear to obtain property. See, e.g., United States v. Robilotto, 828 F.2d 940, 944 (2d
Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1011 (1988) (defendant attempted to force victim with
threats of costly labor shortages to pay union members for doing nothing); United States v.
Burke, 781 F.2d 1234, 1244 (7th Cir. 1985) (defendant told victims only way to avoid indict-
ment that would bankrupt them was to pay him).
11 See United States v. Mattson, 671 F.2d 1020, 1023 (7th Cir. 1982). The Hobbs Act
covers all extorsive acts affecting interstate commerce, not merely those involving racketeer-
ing. See United States v. Frazier, 560 F.2d 884, 886 (8th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S.
968 (1978).
31 See McMonagle, 868 F.2d at 1350; United States v. Santoni, 585 F.2d 667, 673 (4th
Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 910 (1979).
39 See United States v. Billups, 692 F.2d 320, 330 (4th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S.
820 (1983). "A threat of economic harm-unlike the threat of physical harm-is not per se
wrongful; a legal right to the funds or property at issue may therefore justify the threat of
pecuniary harm, depending on the sort of harm threatened." United States v. Kattar, 840
F.2d 118, 123 (1st Cir. 1988). "Wrongful" means without lawful claim or right. Id. at 124.
Fear of economic loss is not always an inherently "wrongful" means; however, when em-
ployed to achieve a wrongful purpose its use is unlawful. See United States v. Clemente, 640
F.2d 1069, 1077 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 820 (1987).
40 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1988).
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of force, fear and violence in their efforts to force the [plaintiff] out
of business. ' 41 The Center also asserted that since the protesters
trespassed on the Center's property and damaged its equipment,
the activity was "wrongful. ' 42 Upon review, the Third Circuit
agreed, finding that the Center had a property right in the contin-
uation of its business and that the defendants' "wrongful" protest
activities, which were aimed at closing the Center, violated the
Hobbs Act.43 Finally, the court concluded that since the Center's
property was injured during this Hobbs Act violation, the pro-
testers were also liable under RICO.44
It would appear that if the reasoning used by the Third Cir-
cuit in McMonagle is adopted by other circuits, it would be possi-
ble to silence protesters through the use or threat of a RICO suit.
Also, since the McMonagle decision was based on a low threshold
of "wrongful" activity, it seems that a group which opposed the
activities or policies of a business would face potential RICO liabil-
ity whenever it took steps which could be considered "wrongful."
Thus, the McMonagle decision highlights the problem of allowing
the target of protest activity, who has suffered only minimal dam-
age, to allege as the predicate act for maintaining a RICO suit that
the protest activity was "wrongful" and violated the Hobbs Act.
To illustrate the problems which could result from the low
threshold of "wrongful" activity established by the Third Circuit,
it is important to consider first that in McMonagle, the Center
claimed that the defendants "used force, threats of force, fear and
violence" to try to drive the Center out of business.45 However, the
"acts of violence" amounted to alleged injuries to one Center em-
ployee who attempted to block the protesters,4 and damage to the
41 McMonagle, 868 F.2d at 1350. MeMonagle had written a fundraising letter which
stated:
[o]ur organization is encouraging and organizing increasingly effective protests at
these abortion chambers .... In March, 1985 we received the welcome news that
the Northeast Women's Center abortion chamber ... would not have its lease
renewed . . . . [T]his abortion chamber lost its lease because of the persistent
prayers and protests of Pro Life citizens.
Id. at 1346 n.3.
42 Id. at 1349.
13 Id. at 1350. The fact that the Center did not go out of business, as was the goal of the
defendants, is not a relevant factor in the RICO analysis. Id.
44 Id.
4 Id.
46 Id. at 1345-47.
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Center's equipment worth less than nine hundred dollars.47 This is,
indeed, a very low threshold of "wrongfulness" to give rise to RICO
liability. Since protests often involve minor property damage, tres-
pass, disturbing the peace, and empty threats,48 it is inappropriate
to subject protesters to RICO liability in addition to prosecution
by the local authorities.49
Secondly, it is also important to note that a plaintiff in a
RICO suit does not have to show that the defendant's actions actu-
ally constituted a violation of a criminal statute in order to prove
that the conduct was "wrongful," and that the defendant extorted
his property through the "wrongful use of fear. ' 50 It is sufficient
merely to demonstrate that the defendant acted without a lawful
claim or right.51 Furthermore, the plaintiff is given the benefit of
only having to prove the "wrongfulness" of the defendant's con-
duct by a "mere preponderance" *standard as opposed to the more
stringent "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard as is required in
criminal trials.5 2 Finally, even though civil RICO is being used to
punish the defendant's "wrongful" conduct, the defendant is not
47 Id.
48 See Melley, supra note 14, at 309-10. The defendants urged the court to consider the
consequences of applying civil RICO in this context: "[i]f two sit-ins at an abortion clinic
trigger federal jurisdiction and RICO applicability, the federal courts will play host to a
variety of social causes: animal rights activists at furriers, antinuclear activists at nuclear
power plants, fundamentalists at adult bookstores, antiapartheid activists at businesses and
universities." Id. at 309-10 n.153 (quoting from defendants' summary judgment
memorandum).
Under this view:
many other individuals and groups would have been guilty of racketeering activity
[according to McMonagle]. Martin Luther King Jr. was guilty of trespassing and
even of harming the property of those against whom he was demonstrating ....
The National Organization for Women, which issued a statement supporting the
[McMonagle] case would be a racketeering enterprise for encouraging civil disobe-
dience. NOW might find that RICO is a two-edged sword if ever anyone wanted to
turn the political tables.
Crovitz, supra note 7, at 28.
"I See Melley, supra note 14, at 309-10. State criminal statutes and tort law already
address the unlawful behavior of protesters. See infra text accompanying notes 70-74. RICO
could also subject those who support and contribute to protest organizations to liability for
the wrongful acts of protesters. See infra note 92 and accompanying text.
80 Note, The Hobbs Act and RICO: A Remedy for Greenmail, 66 TExAS L. REv. 647,
660 (1988). This result flows from the Supreme Court's decision in Sedima, 473 U.S. at 479.
See supra notes 26-27 and accompanying text. In Sedima, the Court eliminated any require-
ment of proving criminal activity to maintain a civil RICO suit. Id.
81 See Note, supra note 50.
81 See id. at 679.
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safeguarded with any criminal procedural protections.5 3
A plaintiff can successfully plead a violation of the Hobbs Act
under McMonagle by maintaining that a right to conduct business
without "wrongful" interference from protest groups exists, and by
asserting coercion based on such "wrongful" protest activity.5 4 By
further claiming minor property damage due to the Hobbs Act vio-
lation, a plaintiff can successfully plead a civil RICO case and sue
for treble damages, injunctive relief, and attorneys' fees. 5
It is clear that RICO was intentionally written broadly to en-
compass the myriad of businesses infiltrated by organized crime. 6
However, it seems equally apparent that Congress did not intend
to extend civil RICO liability to concerned citizens who protest
against what they perceive to be unjust. It is important to note
that serious constitutional issues are raised when RICO is ex-
tended into areas for which it was not intended.5
III. CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS WITH ALLOWING RICO SUITS
AGAINST PROTEST ORGANIZATIONS
Against the backdrop of the first amendment, the use of civil
53 See Note, Civil RICO is a Misnomer: The Need for Criminal Procedural Protections
in Actions Under 18 U.S.C. § 1964, 100 HARv. L. REv. 1288 passim (1987).
" 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a) (1988); see McMonagle, 868 F.2d at 1348-50.
" 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1988); see McMonagle, 868 F.2d at 1348-50.
88 See supra note 3 and accompanying text. The Senate Judiciary Committee Report
on RICO stressed that legitimate businesses were only to be affected by RICO when mob-
sters attempted to use them for unlawful purposes. See Crovitz, supra note 7, at 17. The
concern was that organized crime had already infiltrated many legitimate businesses such
as: jukebox and vending machine distribution, laundry services, food wholesaling, record
manufacturing, nightclubs, and liquor distribution. Id.
Senator John McClellan (Dem.-Ark.), however, stressed that RICO would capture more
than just mobsters, when he stated: "the Constitution applies to those engaged in organized
crime just as it applies to those engaged in white collar crime .... [This bill] must, I
suggest, stand or fall on the constitutional questions without regard to the degree to which
it is limited to organized crime cases." Id.
'1 See supra note 16 and accompanying text. One of the areas where RICO has caused
much first amendment debate is an obscenity law violation included as a "predicate act" in
section 1961(1). See Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 1020, 98 Stat. 2143 (1984). Commentators have
found the forfeiture of all enterprise assets, including a bookseller's non-obscene materials,
to be particularly troubling as a restraint on free expression. See Bandow, The Obscenity of
Federal RICO Laws, in THE RICO RACKET 34-35 (1989). In one instance, over one million
dollars worth of bookstore inventory was seized after the defendants were convicted of sell-
ing six obscene magazines and four obscene videotapes valued at $105.30. See Fort Wayne
Books, Inc. v. Indiana, 489 U.S. 46, 51-52 (1989) (however, pretrial seizure order found un-
constitutional); see also Note, RICO's Forfeiture Provision: A First Amendment Restraint
on Adult Bookstores, 43 U. MLkm L. REv. 419, 446-47 (1988) (arguing that use of RICO to
regulate obscenity presents constitutional problems).
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RICO against protesters such as those in McMonagle poses com-
pelling constitutional questions.5 8 Expressivist activities such as
protest marches, picketing of public and private facilities, mass
mailings, newsletters, and a variety of more creative acts are enti-
tled to protection under the first amendment.5 9 Even though the
Third Circuit recognized that the protest activities in McMonagle
fell under the category of expressive conduct and were entitled to
protection under the first amendment, 0 the court found that the
government's interest in public safety justified the imposition of
limitations on such expression.6 1 Due to the severity of the civil
RICO sanctions, allowing suits in this context arguably might have
a chilling effect on free expression.
A. Symbolic Speech
The Supreme Court has recognized that certain acts take the
form of expression, and are therefore entitled to the same first
amendment protection that speech enjoys.6 The standard em-
ployed examines the acts in question to establish whether they are
" See Melley, supra note 14, at 309-10. "[C]hampions of social causes must now fear
the institution of a RICO action against them, the stigma of being labeled 'racketeers' and
the overwhelming burden of treble damages." Id. at 309. The ACLU has expressed the view
that "civil RICO's potential for chilling First Amendment rights of expression is enormous."
The Washington Post, July 8, 1989, at A-15 (quoting Antonio Califa, legislative counsel to
ACLU).
11 See United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 176-78 (1983). The rights of anti-abortion
picketers to express their views has been found to be protected by the first amendment. See
North Shore Right to Life Comm. v. Manhasset Am. Legion, 452 F. Supp. 834, 838-40
(E.D.N.Y. 1978). Where picketing also inflicts economic injury on the object of the picket-
ing, that fact alone does not make the picketing unlawful. Organization for a Better Austin
v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415, 418-20 (1971). Although a defendant's message may have injured a
plaintiff economically, it can still be entitled to full first amendment protection. See Eagle
Books, Inc. v. Jones, 130 Ill. App. 3d 407, 415, 474 N.E. 2d 444, 449, cert. denied, 474 U.S.
920 (1985).
" See McMonagle, 868 F.2d at 1348-49. The defendants characterized their activities
as "civil disobedience." Id. The court stated that "[t]he defendants have a constitutional
right to attempt to persuade the Northeast Women's Center to stop performing abortions."
Id. at 1349 (quoting district court's jury instructions).
61 See id. at 1348. "The First Amendment, which guarantees individuals freedom of
conscience and prohibits governmental interference with religious beliefs, does not shield
from government scrutiny practices which imperil public safety, peace or order." Id. (quot-
ing United States v. Dickens, 695 F.2d 765, 772 (3d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1092
(1983)). In Dickens, the defendants were convicted of RICO violations for robberies commit-
ted to finance their religious organization. Dickens, 695 F.2d at 772. It is important to note
that the interest asserted by the government when it attempts to limit expression must,
however, be "substantial." United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376-77 (1968).
82 See O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 376.
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sufficiently imbued with elements of communication to implicate
the first amendment based on the context in which the acts oc-
curred and any speech which accompanied the acts. 3 When an act
involves both speech and nonspeech elements, the government
must demonstrate a sufficiently important interest in regulating
the nonspeech element before it can limit the expression which
emanates from the conduct.64 The test for the constitutionality of
the regulation of expressive conduct was outlined in United States
v. O'Brien.5 Under O'Brien, the regulation of conduct must be
within the constitutional power of the government.6 6 Second, there
must be a substantial government interest in regulating the con-
duct.6 7 Third, the government's interest must not be related to the
suppression of free expression .6  Finally, the regulation must first
be no broader than necessary to protect the government interest.69
It is submitted that the use of civil RICO against protest or-
ganizations fails to satisfy the third and fourth prongs of the
O'Brien test, since the individual wrongful acts of protest which
are punishable under state law can be distinguished from the mes-
sage they convey. A message is conveyed by the persistent action
of a protest group, or, in other words, a pattern of activity.7 ° While
"' See Texas v. Johnson, 109 S. Ct. 2533, 2539 (1989). When analyzing whether conduct
is expressive, the issue is whether "[a]n intent to convey a particularized message was pres-
ent, and . . . [if] the likelihood was great that the message would be understood by those
who viewed it." Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 410-11 (1974). Many different types of
conduct have been held to be expressive under this analysis. See, e.g., Tinker v. Des Moines
Indep. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 505-06 (1969) (wearing black armbands to
school); Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131, 141-42 (1966) (sit-in).
" O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 376. If the limitation on the conduct is not related to the
expressive nature, or the message that the actor is attempting to convey, then the test laid
out in O'Brien will apply. See Johnson, 109 S. Ct. at 2538. If, however, the regulation is
"related to the suppression of free expression," the test for constitutionality is much
stricter. See id.
e' 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
'o Id. at 377. In O'Brien, the requirement that males carry a draft registration card was
found to be a constitutional exercise of Congress' power to raise and support armies. Id. at
377-78.
67 Id. The Court has used a variety of synonyms to describe the type of government
interest which can justify a regulation of expression, which include: compelling, substantial,
paramount, cogent, and strong. Id. at 376-77.
6, Id. A court should not try to find an illicit motive behind a regulation. Id. at 383.
Rather, a court should merely examine the statute itself and the legislative history to deter-
mine if the statute is an attempt to limit free expression. Id.
69 Id. at 377.
70 See McMonagle, 868 F.2d at 1349; see also Texas v. Johnson, 109 S. Ct. 2533, 2537
(1989) ("[g]iven the context of an organized demonstration, speeches, slogans, and the dis-
tribution of literature, anyone who observed appellants act would have understood the mes-
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state law addresses the wrongful actions themselves, RICO at-
tempts to curtail the "pattern of racketeering activity."'" Since it is
the pattern of activity that creates a message, and RICO liability
arises from a pattern of activity, it is suggested that the net result
is that RICO liability hinges on conduct which is inherently ex-
pressive. Thus, while state tort law attacks the individual acts of
the group, RICO attacks the pattern from which the expressive
quality of the acts arises.7 2 Since RICO is premised on deterrent-
type remedies, the likely effect of imposing RICO liability on this
kind of conduct is a discontinuation of the pattern of protest activ-
ity and a silencing of the message it seeks to convey.73 Further, it
can be contended that RICO creates a limitation on expressive
conduct which is broader than necessary to limit wrongful protest
activity since state criminal and tort law already provide adequate
redress for victims of disruptive protest acts.74
sage that appellant intended to convey" (quoting Johnson v. State, 755 S.W.2d 92, 95 (Tex.
Ct. App. 1988), aff'd, 109 S. Ct. 2533 (1989))); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community
School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 505 (1969) (high school students allowed to wear black armbands
to protest Vietnam War); Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 368-70 (1931) (display of
red flag to symbolize opposition to government could not be prohibited by statute).
71 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (1988); see United States v. Stofsky, 409 F. Supp. 609, 614
(S.D.N.Y. 1973) ("racketeering acts must have been connected with each other by some
common scheme, plan or motive") (emphasis added).
72 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5) (1988). RICO creates an incentive to plead creatively a state law
tort claim. See Boucher, supra note 30, at 45. By alleging a Hobbs Act violation for interfer-
ence with one's business, a plaintiff can transform a trespass or nuisance action against
protestors into a full-blown RICO suit. See id. Thus, the defendant risks being labeled a
"racketeer" and faces the prospect of treble damages. See id.
73 See Sedima, 473 U.S. at 506 (Marshall, J., dissenting). "Many a prudent defendant,
facing ruinous exposure, will decide to settle even a case with no merit. It is thus not sur-
prising that civil RICO has been used for extortive purposes, giving rise to the very evils
that it was designed to combat." Id.
The risk of RICO being used against protest organizations is bound to increase since
McMonagle. Interestingly, the Report of the Ad Hoc Civil RICO Task Force of the ABA
Section of Corporation, Banking and Business Law revealed that only nine percent of all
civil RICO actions "involved allegations of criminal activity normally associated with profes-
sional criminals." Id. (citing Report of the Ad Hoc Civil RICO Task Force, ABA SEC. CORP.,
BANKING & Bus. LAW 69 (1985)).
Additionally, criminal RICO actions are limited by the United States Attorney's Man-
ual which states that RICO actions must undergo a centralized review process. See U.S.
Department of Justice, United States Attorney's Manual 9-110, at 9-2131. However, "[iun
the context of civil RICO... the restraining influence of prosecutors is completely absent."
Sedima, 473 U.S. at 504, (Marshall, J., dissenting); ee also, Abrams, A New Proposal for
Limiting Private Civil RICO, 37 UCLA L. REV. 11, 20 (1989) (proposing that civil RICO
claims be subjected to "prosecutorial review" which would screen out cases that were based
upon actions which would not merit criminal prosecution).
" See McMonagle, 868 F.2d at 1347. In McMonagle, the plaintiff sought relief under
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B. Reasonable Time, Place, and Manner Restrictions
The Supreme Court has upheld limitations on organized pro-
test activity only when the limits are content neutral. 5 In order to
be deemed content neutral, a restriction must be a limitation of
reasonable time, place, and manner.7" Proponents of extending
civil RICO liability to protest groups who engage in wrongful con-
duct assert that RICO functions as a content neutral regulation on
disruptive protest activity by merely penalizing activity which is
considered extortion under the Hobbs Act. 7 Any protest activity
which does not fall under the ambit of the Hobbs Act is not af-
fected regardless of its message.7 8 The proponents of such liability
conclude that RICO is a reasonable time, place, and manner type
the common-law torts of trespass and intentional interference with contractual relations. Id.
The Hobbs Act's definition of extortion and robbery is based on the New York State crimi-
nal code. See United States v. Furey, 491 F. Supp. 1048, 1062 (E.D. Pa.), af'd, 636 F.2d
1211 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 913 (1981).
The Fifth Circuit recognized the potential for overlap between the federal law and ex-
isting state law-
[t]he scope of the civil RICO statute is breathtaking. An allegation of fraud in
a contract action can transform any ordinary state law claim into a federal racke-
teering charge. It may be unfortunate for federal courts to be burdened by this
kind of case, but it is not for this Court to question policies decided by Congress
and upheld by the Supreme Court.
R.A.G.S. Couture, Inc. v. Hyatt, 774 F.2d 1350, 1355 (5th Cir. 1985).
Justice Thurgood Marshall noted that:
[t]he effects of making a mere two instances of mail or wire fraud potentially
actionable under civil RICO are staggering, because in recent years the Courts of
Appeals have "tolerated an extraordinary expansion of mail and wire fraud stat-
utes to permit federal prosecution for conduct that some had thought was subject
only to state criminal and civil law."
Sedima, 473 U.S. at 502 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting United States v. Weiss, 752 F.2d
777 (2d Cir. 1985) (Newman, J., dissenting)).
7' Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984). The Court
held that a regulation of organized protest activity is constitutional if it is made without
reference to the content of the demonstration, is narrowly tailored to serve a substantial
government interest, and leaves open alternative avenues of communication of the intended
message. Id.
76 Id. at 294; see, e.g., Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37,
45-49 (1983) (when forum is either traditionally open to public or designated open to public,
any regulation on expressive conduct must be content neutral, narrowly tailored to effectu-
ate compelling government interest, and leave open ample channels of communication); Po-
lice Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 94 (1972) (ordinance banning picketing within
150 feet of school fails reasonable time, place and manner test because exception for "peace-
ful picketing of any school involved in a labor dispute" is not content neutral).
77 See McMonagle, 868 F.2d at 1350.
78 Id. at 1348. The Third Circuit stated that "[w]e would have grave concerns were
these or any other defendants held liable under civil RICO for engaging in the expression of
dissenting political opinions in a manner protected under the First Amendment." Id.
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limitation on protest activity.7 9
This argument, however, is open to attack. As described previ-
ously, RICO's jurisdiction over protest activity is very broad,8 0 and
a wide variety of actions taken by a protest group could be charac-
terized as wrongful and accordingly be labelled extortion under the
McMonagle view of the Hobbs Act.8l Relatively minor digressions
from lawful conduct could subject a protester to RICO liability. 2
Since RICO does not contain safeguards to prevent its application
to trivial offenses, 3 it appears that this results not in a reasonable
limitation on the time, place, or manner of protest activity, but a
prohibition of all protest activity involving trespass or other minor
unlawful activity. Moreover, a group unwilling or unable to risk a
large judgment against it, would have fewer avenues of communi-
cation to oppose policies or practices it finds objectionable.8 4
C. Prior Restraints
Regulations that can be classified as prior restraints on expres-
sion are generally looked upon with disdain. 5 The inherent policy
underlying the first amendment is that everyone should have an
19 Cf. Clark, 468 U.S. at 293. The Court will uphold content neutral, time, place, and
manner limitations on protest activity if the limitations are "narrowly tailored" and "leave
open ample alternative channels for communication." Id.
In defense of RICO, Professor Blakey stated that the statute was intended to be applied
broadly:
[r]ead the language... [it] says 'any person.' There's nothing about any per-
son whose name ends in a vowel. It says any person. Stop and think about it for a
minute. It would be obscene if it were otherwise. The statute doesn't apply to
blue-collar people only, or no-collar people only. It applies to everybody.
Crovitz, supra note 7, at 30 (citing Nightline (ABC television broadcast, April 12, 1989)).
10 See supra notes 31-57 and accompanying text.
1, See Melley, supra note 14, at 309. When RICO is applied to ordinary trespass situa-
tions such as in McMonagle, the penalties can be out of proportion to the tort committed.
Id.
I ' See supra notes 45-51 and accompanying text.
83 See supra notes 50-53 and accompanying text.
8 See Melley, supra note 14, at 309.
81 See Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 713 (1931). "In determining the extent of the
constitutional protection, it has been generally, if not universally, considered that it is the
chief purpose of the guaranty to prevent previous restraints upon publication." Id. The Su-
preme Court consistently has adhered to the strong presumption against prior restraints.
See, e.g., Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 556-62 (1976) (state court's prohibi-
tion of press attending murder trial held to be unconstitutional prior restraint); New York
Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971) (government's attempt to enjoin publi-
cation of Pentagon Papers did not overcome presumption against prior restraints); Bantam
Books Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963) (state's attempt to informally censor certain
publications held to be impermissible prior restraint).
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opportunity to be heard.8 However, a premium is placed on the
right to have one's message disseminated, since the speaker can be
punished when the expression is subsequently found to be
unprotected.8 7
It can be argued that RICO represents a potential prior re-
straint on protest activity, based on the threat of severe penalties88
and the provisions regarding conspiracy to commit a RICO of-
fense. 9 If faced with the threat of treble damages and being la-
beled "racketeers," there is a likelihood that groups may curtail
protest activities which fit under the broad umbrella of extortion
as defined in McMonagle. 0
Furthermore, the conspiracy provision of RICO could have a
chilling effect on the recruitment of supporters, since merely by
assisting those who are undertaking the protest activity which is
found to be extortive, a supporter of the organization can become a
target for a civil RICO suit under the conspiracy provision.9' The
threat of RICO liability may cause an erosion of popular support
from concerned but not actively involved parties, and more impor-
tantly, a dwindling of funding for social activist groups by prospec-
tive donors who may fear retribution for "conspiring to violate
RICO" by contributing to the group. 2 It is, therefore, possible to
86 Near, 283 U.S. at 713-14; see Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919)
(Holmes, J., dissenting). Justice Holmes enunciated his "marketplace of ideas" theory which
advocated a policy of allowing everyone an opportunity to be heard. Id. (Holmes, J., dissent-
ing). Justice Holmes believed that under the Constitution the "best test of truth is the
power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market." Id. (Holmes,
J., dissenting). The Court in Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969), subsequently
held that free speech could not be proscribed unless the speech was "directed to inciting or
producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action." Id.
87 Three examples of when the speaker can be punished for speech determined to be
unprotected after its utterance are: (1) obscenity, see Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 23
(1973); (2) defamation, see New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 254 (1964); and (3)
"fighting words," see Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 568 (1942).
See 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1988).
8' See id. § 1962(d).
90 See, Melley, supra note 14, at 309; see also The Washington Post, July 8, 1989, at A-
15 (protest groups are more prudent about activities due to RICO liability fear).
The expense and risk of a RICO judgment will persuade many defendants to settle,
perhaps even agreeing to end the protests rather than defend a suit. See Sedima, 473 U.S.
at 506 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
9' See McMonagle, 868 F.2d at 1350. Because attempted extortion and conspiracy to
commit extortion are crimes under the Hobbs Act, the fact that the protestors did hot
achieve their ultimate goal of closing the center is no defense to the RICO cause of action.
Id. 92 See Melley, supra note 14, at 309.
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
view the fear of retribution merely for supporting a protest group
as a prior restraint on the ability of the group to communicate its
message.
CONCLUSION
RICO was purposefully designed broadly with severe penalties
for use as an effective weapon against organized crime, its intended
target. However, RICO has been applied in many circumstances
not originally intended by Congress, such as the use of RICO's civil
provisions against protest organizations. This usage, in particular,
raises significant first amendment issues. RICO suits, or the mere
threat of these suits, against protesters could have a chilling effect
on free expression, as this Note has suggested. Consequently, the
Supreme Court should scrutinize the use of civil RICO against pro-
test groups, and limit its use when first amendment rights are
threatened.
John P. Barry
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